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The Apostle, Mr. Justice Jackson, and the
"Pathological Perspective" of the Free
Exercise Clause
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*

Abstract
The generally accepted interpretationof Justice William 0. Douglas's
majority opinion in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), casts the case
as a ringingdefense ofreligiousfreedom in the UnitedStates; a trialcourtmay
not charge ajury with inquiringinto thefactual truth ofa defendant's religious
beliefs incident to a prosecutionfor criminalfraud This interpretationof
Ballard is, at least arguably,unduly generous. Bypermittingjuriesto inquire
into a religious leader's subjective goodfaith belief in the tenets of thefaith,
the Ballard majorityprovides an insufficientshieldagainstprosecutionsbased
on antipathytowarda particularreligioussect's beliefs. The better view, ably
expressed by Justice Robert Jackson in his dissent, would have disallowed
inquiries into either the factual truth of a religious sect's beliefs or into the
subjective beliefs of a religiousleaderbecause it is unrealisticto expectjurors
to "separatean issue as to what is believedfrom considerationsas to what is
believable." If a primarypurpose of the FreeExercise Clause is to safeguard
absolutefreedom of religiousbelief JusticeJackson'sapproachto the problem
of religious fraud should be preferred to Justice Douglas 's more limited
approach. Moreover, courts must recognize that the value of a religious
commitment is not dependent on the sincerityofa sect's leaders;the value ofa
religionto a believer simply cannot be measuredby either the goodfaith of the
group's leaders or the plausibilityof the group's beliefs to the largergeneral
public. The Article uses the story line of the motion picture The Apostle to
explore how even an insincere religiousleadercanfacilitategenuinespiritual
growth among his congregants. Justice Jackson's Ballard dissent places
important-andnecessary-emphasison thefreedom to believe in an "apostle"
* John S. Stone Chair, Director ofFaculty Research, & Professor of Law, University of
Alabama School of Law.
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and on the significant value that such belief can provide to congregants.
Members ofa religion shouldhave a right to believe in an "apostle"evenif the
apostle does not believe in himself and the validity of a religiousexperience
does not necessarily correlate with the subjective goodfaith of a religious
leader.
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I. Introduction
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Smith,' which essentially ended the
SherbertYode regime of strict judicial scrutiny of neutral laws of general
applicability that burden religiously motivated conduct,4 the debate about the
1. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require heightened judicial scrutiny of neutral laws of general
applicability).
2. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (holding that before the
government may substantially burden an individual's religiously motivated behavior through a
neutral law of general applicability, it must have a compelling interest and use narrowly tailored
means to achieve that interest).
3. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230-35 (1972) (applying the Sherberttest and
holding that requiring Old Order Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth grade
would violate the Free Exercise Clause).
4. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-79 (holding that an individual's religious beliefs do not
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proper scope of free exercise rights has raged unabated. Critics of Smith
denounce the decision as a betrayal of a basic commitment to protecting an
important human right-namely, freedom of conscience. 5 The defenders,
although fewer in number, have responded by suggesting that Sherbert and
Yoder produced the anomalous result of increasing, rather than reducing, the
net disparity in religious liberty enjoyed by members of minority religious
sects. 6 The ultimate merits of this debate lie beyond my immediate point of
focus, which is a proposition on which all sides of this great debate agree:
Whatever else (if anything) the Free Exercise 7Clause should mean, it should
protect religious belief in near absolute terms.
Indeed, going back to early Free Exercise cases decided in the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court itself repeatedly has asserted that the Free Exercise
Clause protects religious belief, if not conduct mandated by religious belief,
such as the practice of polygamy. 8 Even Justice Scalia, writing for the Smith
majority, readily acknowledged that the Free Exercise Clause protects freedom
of religious belief in nearly absolute terms. 9 Thus, although a religious sect

excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid neutral law of general applicability).
5. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of FreeExercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2
(describing the criticism of Smith and arguing that the decision fails to adequately protect the
free exercise of religion); Michael McConnell, ReligiousFreedom at a Crossroads,59 U. C.
L. REv. 115, 116 (1992) (arguing that Smith allows the state to interfere with religious practice
without any substantial justification).
6. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 4-10, 14-15, 78-93 (2007) (questioning the wisdom and the fairness of the
selective exemptions approach to the Free Exercise Clause and proposing instead an equalitybased model); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 377-83 (arguing that the Sherbert/Yoder approach unfairly
favored mainstream religions, and particularly Christian sects, but did little to advance the
ability of non-traditional religions and religionists to engage in religiously-mandated behavior
that would violate a neutral law of general applicability).
7. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine
one desires."); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Si~cle
Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 299 (2000) ("Whether or not it is more than an antidiscrimination
norm, the free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination norm.").
8. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) ("Congress was deprived [by
the Free Exercise Clause] of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."); see also Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("The first amendment... was intended to allow every one
such notions respecting his relation to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved
by his judgments and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he
may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others.").
9. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 ("The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.").
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would not be free to observe the practice of ritual human sacrifice, it should
be-and in theory is-entirely free to hold the belief that this practice is
essential to achieving eternal salvation and, moreover, to teach the necessity of
ritual human sacrifice among its members.' ° In sum, "[t]he door of the Free
Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such.""
Unfortunately, however, our real world
commitment to freedom of religious belief might not be as broad as this high
sounding judicial rhetoric would suggest.12
UnitedStates v. Ballard13 presented this issue front and center: Could the
federal government put the truth of particular religious beliefs before ajury, on
the theory that the beliefs constituted fraud? 14 The Ballards (Guy, Edna, and
son Donald) presided over the "I Am" sect and claimed to have direct contact
with God through the intercession of"St. Germain.' 5 The Ballards sought and
received financial contributions in support of the church.16 In return for these
faith offerings, members of "I Am" could look forward to many benefits,
including faith healings. 1718 The government brought criminal fraud charges
against all three Ballards.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, opined that although government
could not put the truth or falsity of the Ballards' religious beliefs on trial, it
could charge a jury with ascertaining whether a particular religious leader
subjectively believed the doctrines that he espoused. 19 Justice Douglas's
opinion is a mainstay of First Amendment casebooks and often serves to
establish the strong protection that the First Amendment affords to religious

10. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
12. See generally WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILTY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 1-3, 7-8, 36-37, 84-86 (2005) (arguing that pervasive cultural bias makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for the law to secure equal rights for all religions and religionists).
13. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85 (1944) (finding that the question of
whether the beliefs of the "I Am" sect were true or false should not have been submitted to a

jury).
14. Id. at 85.
15. Id. at79.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 79-80.
18. Id. at 79-81. The sect's leader, Guy Ballard, died before the government initiated the
fraud prosecution but was named in the indictment anyway. See id. at 79-80 (asserting that
"Guy W. Ballard, now deceased" and "Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime," made fraudulent
representations to his followers, along with his wife, Edna, and his son, Donald).
19. Id.at88.
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belief.2° This might be an unduly sympathetic reading of the Douglas opinion.
To state the matter simply, if minority religions and religionists face pervasive
forms of discrimination and widespread hostility within the general culture, is a
trial limited to subjective belief likely to afford an adequate margin of
protection for strange, or even offensive, religious beliefs? 2' The question does
not admit of any easy or obvious answer.
Professor Vincent Blasi famously argued that the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment could best serve its central purpose by protecting core
political speech in times of perceived social and political crisis. 22 The
"pathological perspective," Blasi argued, implies that judges should be most
vigilant in superintending speech restrictions when the social cost of free
speech could be jaw-droppingly high.23 He also suggested that the scope of
free speech protection might best be defined narrowly but deeply; 24 that is to
say, if core political speech in times of war or crisis represents the most crucial
role for freedom of speech, then it would be best for judges to hold their
powder for use in this context, rather than in cases involving so-called "low
value" speech, such as pornography or commercial advertising.2 The smaller
20. See generally DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW (2003).

(2003); KATHLEEN

SULLIVAN&

21. Consider, for example, the cold war waged between the Internal Revenue Service and
the Church of Scientology in the 1970s and 1980s. For a discussion of this conflict, see
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A
ComparativeAnalysis and Some Thoughts on SelectedIssues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAuL
L. REV. 85 (1997). In contemporary Germany, efforts to suppress the Church of Scientology not
only exist, but clearly enjoy official government approval and support. See Michael Cieply &
Mark Landler, Plot Thickens in a Tom Cruise Film, Long Before the Cameras Begin to Roll,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at B7 (discussing the German government's efforts to suppress the
Church of Scientology, which it views as a "dangerous cult" that some government officials
believe should be "banned"); Michael Browne, Should Germany Stop Worrying andLearn to
Love the Octopus?: Freedom ofReligion and the Church ofScientology in the UnitedStates, 9
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 194-98 (1998) (same).
22. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLuM. L. REV. 449,449-50 (1985) ("[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip
the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to
stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment.., should be targeted for the worst of
times.").
23. Id. at 456-58, 464-66.
24. See id. at 479-80 ("But the pathological perspective counsels that this development
will best serve the constitutional regime if it proceeds cautiously, with careful attention to the
costs of expanding the amendment's reach. Those costs seem highest when the activities
encompassed by a doctrinal innovation bear little intuitive resemblance in terms of social
function or moral significance to the activities that have been at the center of the traditional
understanding of the first amendment.").
25. See id. at 474-80 (describing the proper limits of free speech protection).
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universe of constitutionally protected "free speech" would enjoy deeper
protection precisely because the scope of the right would implicate less speech,
thereby lowering (at least in theory) the potential social cost of providing nearabsolute protection from government regulation or proscription.
This Article argues that the federal courts would do well to apply the
"pathological perspective" to the Free Exercise Clause. By this, I mean to
suggest that freedom of religious belief really should enjoy absolute protection
from government abridgement as a function of the Free Exercise Clause
precisely because when the reasons for suppressing religious beliefs seem
sufficiently important,26 the legal bulwark designed to protect religious belief
must be equal to the challenge. And, in this regard, the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson in Ballard27 has much more to recommend it than does the
majority opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas.
Finally, drawing on Robert Duvall's masterful film, The Apostle,28 this
Article attempts to demonstrate the dangers inherent in permitting prosecutors
and jurors to plumb the hearts and consciences of religious believers to
ascertain whether a particular religious leader possesses subjective belief in the
26. For example, the emergence of new high demand religions in the 1960s and the
1970s, pejoratively labeled "cults," led to a great deal of legal scholarship dedicated to justifying
and privileging highly invasive "deprogramming" tactics, including kidnapping and coercive
interrogation methods. Were such tactics used to convince a Presbyterian to change her
religious stripes, there would be no serious question about the criminal law and tort implications
of the "deprogramming." For examples of this scholarship, see generally Douglas Aronin,
Cults, Deprogramming,and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Proposal,17 CoLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 163 (1982); Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle
Persuasion Underthe FirstAmendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1977); Richard Delgado, When
Religious Exercise is Not Free: Deprogrammingand the ConstitutionalStatus of Coercively
InducedBelief 37 VAND. L. REv. 1171 (1984); Robert J. Shapiro, OfRobots, Persons,andthe
Protectionof Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1277 (1983); Margaret T. Singer, Coming
Out of the Cults, 12 PSYCH. TODAY 72, 72-73 (1979). In other words, if a religious group
maintains sufficiently outrageous beliefs, there is a strong social tendency to accept efforts to
subordinate or destroy the organization. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the
(Underappreciated)Merits ofSmith, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189, 1220-49 (2008). See also The
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 66
(1890) (upholding a law that disincorporated the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
and seized all of its assets); Laycock, supra note 5, at 62-63 (discussing the pervasive
persecution of the Mormons by both the federal and state governments). For an overview ofthe
problem of pervasive social hostility to new and high demand religions, see generally Cynthia
Norman Williams, America's Opposition to New Religious Movements: Limiting the Freedom
of Religion, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 171 (2003).
27. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting that prosecutions requiring the determination ofthe sincerity of an individual's religious
beliefs could easily degenerate into religious persecution).
28. THE APOSTLE (Butcher's Run Films 1998).
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doctrines and dogmas she espouses. The protection of religious belief, which
should lie at the very center of the Free Exercise Clause, requires that the
federal courts summarily reject any government effort, whether direct or
indirect, to call into question the validity of religious beliefs.
II. The Protectionof Religious Beliefand the FreeExercise Clause
As noted in the Introduction, whatever else the Free Exercise Clause might
mean, at a minimum it protects the freedom to believe whatever religious tenets
one wishes to embrace. As Chief Justice Warren once stated the matter, "[t]he
freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. '' 29 If this represents
the central mission of the Free Exercise Clause, one might consider endorsing a
kind of "pathological perspective" on the Free Exercise Clause that works to
secure this central purpose in a reliable, if not entirely reflexive, fashion. As
this section will demonstrate, however, the federal courts have failed to secure
freedom of religious belief in absolute terms.
A. The Belief/Conduct Dichotomy and the FreeExercise Clause
Going back to the major free exercise cases of the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court consistently has held that the Free Exercise Clause protects
freedom of belief, if not freedom of action mandated by religious belief. Thus,
in 1879, the Supreme Court observed that "[l]aws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices." 30 At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court squarely rejected the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause provided
any protection whatsoever to religiously motivated conduct that ran afoul of
neutral laws of general application: "It was never intended or supposed that the
amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the
3
punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society." '
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Free Exercise Clause protected
action, rather than belief, because "[t]o permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in

29. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
30. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
31. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); see also Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs, but not conduct mandated by
such beliefs).
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3 2 "Government
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
33
circumstances.
such
under
could exist only in name
The Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause in a line of cases beginning with Sherbert v. Verner 34 and ending with
Employment Division v. Smith.35 During the Sherbertera, the Supreme Court
protected religiously mandated behavior by applying strict scrutiny to neutral
laws of general applicability that burdened religiously motivated conduct.36
Justice Brennan explained that "[i]t is basic that no showing of merely a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice" to justify a
"substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right. 37 Sherbert
thus undermined the belief/conduct dichotomy reflected in the Supreme Court's
nineteenth century free exercise precedents. Subsequent cases, such as
Wisconsin v. Yoder,38 applied heightened forms of judicial scrutiny to neutral
laws of general applicability that, as applied, impeded religiously motivated
conduct.
During this period, however, the Court's commitment to protecting
freedom of belief never waivered; the Sherbert/Yoder era provided enhanced
protection for religiously motivated conduct, but this did not imply any reduced
protection for religious belief (which, since Reynolds and Davis, the Justices
declared to be within the aegis of the Free Exercise Clause). Indeed, in
Sherbert itself, Justice Brennan began his legal analysis by stating and

32.

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.

33. Id.; see Krotoszynski, supra note 26, at 1199-1207 (discussing the belief/conduct
dichotomy and the principal cases addressing it).
34. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (holding that before the
government may substantially burden an individual's religious liberty it must have a compelling
interest and use the least burdensome means to regulate religiously motivated conduct to
achieve its interest).
35. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990) (concluding that the
Free Exercise Clause does not require more than traditional rationality review for neutral laws of
general applicability); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 6, at 78-79, 83-87,257-67 (describing
the expansion of the Free Exercise Clause).
36. For examples of cases that apply Sherbert's strict scrutiny analysis, see Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
37. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
38. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that for Wisconsin to
compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade over free exercise objections, the State must
either, in fact, not burden religious exercise, or present an interest "of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
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reaffirming the proposition that the Free3 9Exercise Clause bars "any government
regulation of religious beliefs as such.
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed course and restored the preSherbert belief/conduct dichotomy in Smith. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia opined that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes). 40
Even as Justice Scalia eviscerated the
Sherbert/Yoder line ofprecedents, he cheerfully acknowledged that "[t]he free
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.'
Without taking a firm position on the merits of Smith in this venue,42 it
suffices simply to note that an unbroken line of precedent stands for the
proposition that, as an incident of the Free Exercise Clause, religious beliefs are
to be entirely free from government regulation. The question then arises: How
dedicated, in practice, are the federal courts to ensuring that religious beliefs are
not subject either to direct or indirect forms of government coercion?
B. Ballard and Freedom of Religious Belief
43
In 1944, in United States v. Ballard,
the Supreme Court noted that
"[h]eresy trials are foreign to our Constitution"44 and held that citizens "may
believe what they cannot prove" and "may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs., 45 In so ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's contrary holding that permitted a jury to "question the truth of
the representations concerning [the Ballards'] religious doctrines or beliefs." 46
The standard reading of Ballardscores the decision as a victory for religious
freedom because it disallows government from putting the truth of religious
beliefs (quite literally) on trial. To some extent, the decision bears out this

39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
41. Id. at 877.
42. For my views on Smith's merits, see generally Krotoszynski, supra note 26.
43. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85 (1944) (holding that a trial court should
not submit to a jury the question of whether the beliefs of the "I Am" sect are factually true or
false, but also holding that a jury could constitutionally determine whether the "I Am" sect's
leaders actually believe the sect's teachings).
44. Id. at 86.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 85-86.
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reading-undoubtedly having jurors determine religious truth would ill serve
freedom of conscience in matters of faith.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, reinstated the district court's
approach, which the court of appeals had rejected.47 The district court
instructed the jury not to consider the ultimate truth of the Ballards' religious
claims, but stated the controlling issue in the fraud trial as follows:
Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If
they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that.
If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe that
Jesus came down and dictated, or that Saint Germain came down and
dictated, did not believe the things that they wrote, the things that they
preached, but used the mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury
should find them guilty. Therefore, gentlemen, religion cannot come into
this case.48
Justice Douglas squarely endorsed these jury instructions, holding that "we
conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury
all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines
of [the Ballards] ."49 Thus, for the majority, the Free Exercise Clause precludes
asking ajury to inquire into the truth of particular religious beliefs, but does not
preclude ajury from determining subjective good faith (i.e., whether a religious
leader actually subjectively believes what she professes).50
If the alternative would be permitting jurors to engage in religious fact
findings, limiting the jury's inquiry to subjective good faith plainly represents
the better course of action.51 But a serious question exists regarding whether an
average juror can distinguish between actual subjective good faith belief and
the general plausibility of a religious belief (viewed through the lens of the
belief systems of the dominant religious groups within the culture, whose
members are quite likely to staff petit juries). The stranger or more outlandish a
47. Id. at 88.
48. Id. at 81-82.
49. Id. at 88.
50. Id.
51. But cf id. at 89-90 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("I cannot say that freedom of thought
and worship includes freedom to procure money by making knowingly false statements about
one's religious experiences.... The state of one's mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent
misrepresentation as is one's physical condition or the state of his bodily health."). Chief
Justice Stone would have reversed the Court of Appeals and simply reinstated the convictions
obtained following the district court trial. See id. at 92 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("As no legally
sufficient reason for disturbing it appears, I think that the judgment below should be reversed
and that of the District Court reinstated.").
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religious belief appears, when viewed through the lens of the dominant culture,
the less likely a juror will be to find that a defendant actually believes the
dogma in question. Thus, asking a juror to assess subjective belief is in
practice not really very far removed from asking the juror to assess religious
truth.
C. Mr. Justice Jackson and the PathologicalPerspective
Justice Robert Jackson dissented strongly from the majority's holding that
the district court properly instructed the jury to consider the issue of the
52
Ballards' subjective good faith belief in the doctrines of the "I Am" cult.
Jackson questioned whether "misrepresentation of religious experience
or belief
5 3
is prosecutable" and emphasized "the danger of such prosecutions.
To be clear, Justice Jackson did not appear to be particularly sympathetic
to the Ballards or their cult: "I should say that the defendants have done just
that for which they are indicted. If I might agree to their conviction without
creating a precedent, I cheerfully would do so. I can see in their teachings
nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth. 5 4 Thus, he was not any
more subjectively convinced of the value of the "I Am" cult than the majority or
other dissenting members of the Court.
The problem, however, was the plausibility of distinguishing subjective
good faith belief from assessing the truth of a religion's precepts more
generally. "In the first place, as a matter of either practice or philosophy I do
not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations
as to what is believable. 5 5 This is so because "[t]he most convincing proof that
one believes his statements is to show that they have been true in his
experience. 5 6 Justice Jackson also asked rhetorically: "How can the
Government prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot
prove to be false? 5 7 He comes to the heart of the matter when he asserts that
"[ilf we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the
dispute from the very 5considerations
which in common experience provide its
8
most reliable answer.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Serious social costs would result from the adoption of Justice Jackson's
approach; persons susceptible to the siren song of a modem day Elmer Gantry
might well part with good portions of their wealth in aid of currying favor with
God via a complete charlatan. Thus, barring inquiries into either the truth of a
religion or the good faith subjective belief of its leaders would surely open up
the community to intentional forms of religious fraud. Jackson acknowledges
this fact and frankly admits that "[t]he Ballards are not alone in catering to [the
public's need for spiritual reassurance and enlightenment] with a pretty dubious
product."59
The problem is that the benefits of any religious commitment are
intrinsically non-material; there is no market price for peace of mind in troubled
times:
If members of the [I Am] sect get comfort from their 'Saint Germain,'
however doubtful it seems to me, it is hard to say that they do not get what
they pay for. Scores of sects flourish in this country by teaching what to me
It is plain that there is wide variety in American
are queer notions.
6
religious taste. 0
To be sure, a sense of profound disillusionment must accompany a loss of faith
in a religion or a religious leader. People "live in mental confusion or moral
anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and moral support. When they
are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism and confusion follow., 6 1 Thus,
the main harm of religious frauds "is not in the money the62victims part with half
so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get.,
Even so, a meaningful commitment to freedom of religious belief requires
protection of both Billy Graham and Elmer Gantry. Justice Jackson argues,
persuasively, that "the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press
is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish." 63 This is
not because "rubbish" has constitutional value, but rather because
"[p]rosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious
persecution. "64 This does not mean that religion insulates fraud that relates to
the material, as opposed to the spiritual, plane. Justice Jackson explains that he
does "not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud for making
59. Id. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There appear
to be persons-let us hope not many-who find refreshment and courage in the teachings of the
'I Am' cult.").
60. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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false representations on matters other than faith or experience, as for example if
one represents that funds are being used to construct a church when in fact they
are being used for personal purposes., 65 That said, if a fraud prosecution does
related claim, the prosecution "reaches into a
not relate to a specific non-belief
66
wholly dangerous ground."
Jackson asks "when does less than full belief in a professed credo become
actionable fraud if one is soliciting gifts or legacies?, 67 Inquiry into subjective
belief presents real jeopardy to the virtuous as well as the wicked. For
example, the recently published writings of Mother Teresa indicate that she
experienced serious moments of spiritual doubt and uncertainty; 68 would this
mean that Mother Teresa would have been subject to criminal trial and
conviction for fraud if she subjectively harbored doubts about the central tenets
of Roman Catholicism, yet nevertheless solicited financial contributions in aid
of it? 69 As Justice Jackson argues, "[s]uch inquiries may discomfort orthodox
as well as unconventional religious teachers, for even the most regular 70of them
are sometimes accused of taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt."
In the end, Justice Jackson admonishes that the more prudent course of
action would be to disallow not merely inquiries into religious truth, but also
inquiries into subjective good faith belief. "I would dismiss the indictment and1
have done with this business of judicially examining other people's faiths.'

Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
68. See MOTHER TERESA &BRIAN KOLODIEJCHUK, MOTHER TERESA: COME BE My LIGHT
178-83 (2007) (describing her own spiritual struggles); see also Editorial, A SaintofDarkness,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at A26 (discussing Mother Teresa's doubts about the existence of
God in her personal, private writings); Michael Gerson, The Torment of Teresa, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 2007, at A21 ("What are we to make of Mother Teresa's letters... which reveal
decades of spiritual depression, loneliness, and doubt? Should this console us or disturb us?").
69. Of course, this hypothetical is deeply counterfactual: No sane prosecutor would
initiate charges against a figure like Mother Teresa, precisely because her religious views and
ethics, to say nothing of her public reputation as a living saint while alive, rest so squarely
within the religious mainstream in the contemporary United States. This is another important
aspect of the problem: The motive to initiate a prosecution itself stems, more likely than not,
from religious antipathy. Whether such a prosecution would be initiated against the selfproclaimed returned Christ and general purpose "messiah," the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, is a
different question entirely. My question: Should it be, in a nation ostensibly dedicated to
freedom of religious belief? Cf Robert Sherrill, Uncle Sam andRev. Moon, WASH. POST, May
26, 1991, at X7 (describing the prosecution of Rev. Moon).
70. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
65.
66.
67.
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III. The Problem of Pervasive DiscriminationAgainst Unpopular
Religious Minorities and the ConcomitantNeed to Protect
Religious BeliefAbsolutely

Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Ballard endorses a broad
prophylactic rule against inquiries not only into religious truth, but also into the
subjective good faith of a religious leader.72 Justice Douglas, by way of
contrast, believes that inquiries into subjective good faith are not inconsistent
with a meaningful commitment to protecting freedom of conscience. 73 So,
where do the merits lie? In my view, Justice Jackson has the better of the
74
argument. Pervasive hostility to non-traditional religions and religionists
means that inquiries into subjective good faith are virtually certain to devolve
into questions about the cultural acceptability-indeed plausibility--of a
particular sect.
Professor Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has written lucidly about the
"impossibility" of religious freedom because of the limitations that culture
erects around the very concept of"religion."05 Simply put, the average juror (or
judge) is incapable of divorcing completely the plausibility of a defendant's

72. Id. (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
73. See id.
at 83-88 (holding that the government may require the Ballards to demonstrate
their faith in the "I Am" religion and finding the imposition of this obligation to be entirely
compatible with the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause prevents the Ballards from having
to prove the truth of their religious beliefs).
74. In an ideal world, unfamiliar religious beliefs and believers would not provoke fear or
anger-but we do not live in such a world. See, e.g., Andrea Stone, Muslim Sect Resisted In
Md., USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2007, at 3A (reporting on local efforts to block construction of a
mosque and community center in rural Walkersville, Maryland). One resident of Walkersville,
Maryland explained opposition to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community's efforts to build
facilities in the area in the following terms: "There's a lot of animosity. No, that's not a good
word. There's a lot of, shall we say, apprehension." Id. Interestingly, "[t]he Ahmadis are
considered heretics by Islam's Sunnis and Shiites and maintain no ties to mainstream Muslims."
Id. Having left inhospitable places, such as Pakistan, where the government declared the
members of the sect to be "non-Muslims," the sect has found itself facing religious
discrimination and hostility in a nation ostensibly dedicated to respecting religious pluralism.
Id.
75. See SuLLIvAN, supra note 12, at 1-8, 35-36, 61-62, 84-85 (arguing that religious
freedom is impossible because the law requires believers to define their religion in a fashion
persuasive to government officials who do not share the same religious beliefs or commitments;
thus, an essential precondition to achieving full religious equality cannot be met because
everyone maintains different-and fundamentally incompatible-definitions of what constitutes
"religion"); see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 6, at 6-11, 86-108 (proposing an
overarching "equal liberty" theory of the Religion Clauses and questioning the basic fairness of
a patchwork approach to religious exemptions that treats some religious groups significantly
better than others without any apparent neutral reason for so doing).
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religious claims from her own religious experiences and commitments.7 6 If the
claims seem odd or, worse yet, offensive, it is unlikely that a reasonable juror
would find that a person held a subjective good faith belief in the tenets of the
faith. As Justice Jackson put the matter, it is quite impossible to divorce
entirely the question of what is believed from the question of what is
believable.77
If pervasive social prejudice against new, oddball religions and religionists
is a social fact, then protecting belief requires more than simply refraining from
submitting the truth of a religion's tenets to ajury. Ajury will draw on its own
cultural understanding of religion in judging whether or not a defendant
possesses a subjective good faith belief in the tenets of her faith. And, in this
calculus, Moonies and Gozer worshippers 7879are very likely to come out less
well than Orthodox Jews and Episcopalians.
IV. The Theory Applied: Sonny Dewey and the Problem ofAscertaining
Subjective Religious Belief
In his critically acclaimed film, The Apostle, 80 Robert Duvall wrote,
directed, and starred as Euliss F. "Sonny" Dewey, a Pentecostal minister
leading a megachurch congregation in metropolitan Houston, Texas. Sonny
learns that his wife, Jessie (played by Farrah Fawcett), has been engaged in an
ongoing adulterous relationship with the church's youth minister, Horace. A
separation follows and Jessie and Horace end up in control of both Sonny's
76. See SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 8 (arguing that "[f]orsaking religious freedom as a
legally enforced right might enable greater equality among persons and greater clarity and selfdetermination for religious individuals and communities" because it is "arguably impossible [to
justly enforce] laws granting persons rights that are defined with respect to their religious beliefs
or practices"); id. at 154 (arguing that efforts to protect "religion" inevitably entail gross forms
of social and cultural bias, asserting "religion is not always, in fact, absolutely free, legally
speaking," and positing that "[t]he right kind of religion, the approved religion, is always that
which is protected, while the wrong kind, whether popular or unpopular, is always restricted or
prohibited").
77. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I
do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is
believable.").
78. See Krotoszynski, supra note 26, at 1195-96, 1196 n.33 (arguing that discrimination
against unpopular religions with unfamiliar, or even offensive, beliefs is probably inevitable and
using a hypothetical sect of Gozer worshippers to make this point, drawing on the fictional
theology of the motion picture Ghostbusters).
79. See SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 7-8 (describing how current law consistently and
predictably disadvantages members of nonmainstream faiths).
80. THE ApOsTE (Butcher's Run Films 1998).
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children and his megachurch. Unhappy with this outcome, Sonny consumes a
great deal of alcohol and, in a drunken rage, beats Horace to death with a
baseball bat in front of a stunned audience at a youth league baseball game.
Fleeing arrest and criminal charges, Sonny relocates to a (fictional) small
Louisiana town, Bayou Boutte, and establishes a new congregation. His efforts
in the small town are nothing short of transformative; he brings hope and,
indeed, salvation, to the town and its denizens.
I always have viewed Sonny as a fraud. After all, how could Sonny claim
a sincere vocation after having attacked and murdered his wife's lover with a
baseball bat in front of an audience of stunned children and parents?
Moreover, Sonny was incapable of fidelity to his wife and, even while on the
lamb in Bayou Boutte, repeatedly attempts double adultery (both he and the
object of Sonny's affections are legally married) with the secretary at the local
radio station.8 ' Sonny also is a shameless liar and a manipulator; for example,
he tells Brother Blackwell, a friendly local retired minister that "God sent me"
when in fact Sonny relocates to Bayou Boutte after being told by another
person that an abandoned church, once pastored by his cousin, is there. 82 It
would have been far more accurate-and truthful-to say that "your cousin sent
me." Truth and Sonny travel different roads.
Finally, the film prominently features several extended scenes in which
Sonny engages in a monologue with the deity. Alas, God does not seem to be
taking Sonny's calls-something that Sonny seems to realize.
My
interpretation of the movie has always been that although Sonny brought hope
and meaning to his congregants in Bayou Boutte, he himself lacked both (i.e.,
that he was a fraud, in the sense that Sonny himself either lacked faith or
possessed grave doubts about his relationship to God). 3 In light of his poor
81. Alas, the secretary's virtue proves more resilient than Sonny's and his efforts at
seduction prove unavailing. A later scene in the movie shows the secretary having dinner at a
local restaurant with her husband and children, implying that she might well have reconciled
with him.
82. Showing good sense, Brother Blackwell refuses to credit at face value the Apostle
E.F.'s claim that God sent him to Blackwell, asking Sonny, "How do I know that it wasn't the
Devil who sent you to me?" Blackwell ultimately sees the merit of Sonny's efforts to restore
and rebuild his ministry, and he becomes a firm backer of Sonny's "One Way to Heaven"
church.
83. Interestingly, my interpretation of the film was not shared by Roger Ebert, the
prominent cinastd and film critic, who felt that Duvall intends for us to believe that Sonny is
entirely sincere in his religious beliefs and is not, in fact, a fraud. See Roger Ebert, The Apostle
(Jan. 30, 1998), http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/19980130/REVIEWS/
801300301/1023 (last visited June 16, 2008) (explaining that Sonny has an authentic religious
calling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This might be a distinction without
a difference: I do not think Sonny sought to defraud his congregants for his own financial or
personal aggrandizement (i.e., he is no Elmer Gantry), yet I do think that Duvall clearly implies
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character, penchant for mendacity and adultery, and his clear love of nice cars,
fancy houses, and well-tailored suits, I interpreted the character as little
different from a talented thespian-the Shakespearian ringer who can,
seemingly without effort, nail highly complex tragic characters like Lear or
Titus Andronicus.
In other words, I interpreted "the Prophet E.F." (Sonny's alias while in
Bayou Boutte) as a skilled performer, but a performer who was quite self-aware
at some level that he was a performer rather than a genuine holy man. The
irony of the movie, at least for me, was that the Prophet E.F. did in fact serve as
an apostle; he did bring hope and meaning to the people of Bayou Boutte, and
their spiritual development was not in any way contingent on whether or not
Sonny subjectively believed in Jesus, God, or the Holy Trinity.
The emotional highlight of the film involves, quite literally, a "Come to
Jesus" moment when a racist redneck, artfully played by Billy Bob Thornton,
threatens to bulldoze the "One Way to Heaven Church" because of its
integrated congregation. The Apostle E.F. works his magic and Thornton's
character experiences a tearful epiphany, recognizes the basic humanity of all
people in God's eyes, and ceases and desists in his effort to tear down (literally)
the church. The conversion was real, the effects were real, and the
reintegration of Thornton's character into the community was real. Whether or
not Sonny was channeling the Holy Ghost or Laurence Olivier simply did not
matter-the outcome was profound, real, and important.
Suppose, as happened to Guy, Edna, and Donald Ballard, a local federal
prosecutor initiated charges against Sonny for fraud. Suppose that Sonny
solicits, over the airwaves and by mail, donations in exchange for faith healings
or other forms of divine intercession-as he in fact does in the film. Would
Sonny be subject to criminal conviction and imprisonment if a prosecutor can
convince a jury that Sonny does not subjectively believe that he has the power
to heal physical ailments or to speak with the deity on behalf of congregants?
To be clear, the harm to freedom of religious belief is not to Sonny (by
stipulation, under my interpretation of the character, he does not actually
believe what he says) but rather to Sonny's congregants; they have a right to
believe in Sonny even if Sonny does not believe in himself. In fact, this was
the central dramatic strength of the The Apostle: Sonny was an "apostle" even
though he seriously doubted his own relationship to God precisely because he
facilitated the faith and spiritual healing of his congregants. The subjective

that Sonny seriously doubts his relationship to God and perhaps even his own faith. To me, to
preach faith in God while not believing in God is to commit a kind of fraud, although a fraud of
a spiritual sort rather than the more mundane financial sort.
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belief of a religious leader has no necessary bearing on the effect of the leader
on his followers' spiritual development. To attack the leader as a fraud by
implication impugns the validity of the congregants' religious experiences, for
if the leader of a congregation is in bad faith-is a sort of fraud-how could the
congregants' religious experiences not also be fraudulent, false, and ersatz?
The answer, it seems to me, is that there can be no such thing as "fraud" in
the realm of religious belief. The value of a spiritual leader or advisor is not
measured in dollars and cents, but rather in terms of the effect of that leadership
on congregants. And because spiritual growth and inner peace are not traded
on the Chicago commodities exchange, it simply is not possible to ascertain
whether someone has obtained a good deal or a bad deal in supporting a
particular religious organization or religious leader.
V. Conclusion
Justice Douglas's opinion in Ballardreceives a warmer reception than it
should from those who believe that the Free Exercise Clause should secure total
freedom of religious belief. Instead, advocates of strong protection for freedom
of belief should cast their lot with Justice Jackson's more comprehensive
protection of the concept.
Protecting religious belief requires more than fending off direct efforts to
impose burdens or withhold benefits based on religious convictions; instead, a
meaningful commitment to protecting religious belief requires government to
abstain from attempting to define religious truth via both direct and indirect
means. Justice Jackson recognized that a genuine commitment to religious
freedom of belief prevents the government not only from putting faith directly
on trial, but also requires preventing the government from putting the perceived
plausibility of faith on trial. 84 Attempting to ascertain whether a person
subjectively believes the tenets of her faith calls into question the believability
of those tenets, when viewed through the lens of the dominant religious culture.
The Apostle frames the issue in the starkest possible terms: Whether a
person possesses subjective belief in particular religious tenets can be a
remarkably difficult matter to ascertain correctly. Should chronic behavior
totally inconsistent with the ethics and morality of a religious group be
sufficient evidence to conclude that a particular religious leader does not, in
84. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Free Exercise Clause should prevent a trial court from either charging a jury
with determining the factual truth of a religion's precepts or with determining a religious
leader's subjective belief in the tenets of her faith).
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fact, believe what he professes? In the real world, a reasonable juror could
certainly find murder, serial adultery, and persistent untruthfulness a sufficient
basis for concluding that a defendant religious leader lacks subjective, good
faith belief in the standard Judeo-Christian doctrines (indeed, Sonny had
serious difficulty obeying several of the Ten Commandments and seemed very
little troubled by these unholy habits).
Surely it is at least plausible to worry that a juror is as likely to measure
the existence or non-existence of subjective belief by behavior that seems
consistent (or inconsistent) with those beliefs as from any sworn testimony
offered at trial. Moreover, the more outlandish the beliefs, at least when
viewed through the prism of local religious culture, the less likely it will be that
a person drawn from that culture will find subjective belief exists. Thus, a
seeming hypocrite espousing weird or offensive religious viewpoints would be
unlikely to receive a sympathetic hearing, were charges for fraud lodged against
her.
Protecting religious belief entails abjuring not only heresy trials, but also
trials of the heart, soul, and mind. Mr. Justice Jackson understood this, but Mr.
Justice Douglas did not. For this reason, Justice Jackson's dissent in Ballard
deserves a more prominent place in our discussions of the core meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause. If, as Justice Brennan insisted, the "door of the Free
Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such, 85 it might well be necessary, as a kind of prophylactic
measure, to protect absolutely the ability of religious leaders to make
theological claims-however untrue, mendacious, or financially-motivated they
might seem to a non-believer.
Free exercise means the ability to find an Apostle and to follow him (or
her) by one's own best lights; freedom implies the ability to make both good
and bad choices-and to live with the consequences. Justice Jackson
understood these realities and accepted, indeed embraced, the implications of
full and total freedom of religious belief; Justice Douglas, by way of contrast,
understood the nature of the problem only imperfectly and thus failed to
"tightly close the door" against indirect efforts to regulate religious belief.
Simply put, the need to protect the overly credulous from themselves does
not-and cannot-outweigh the need to secure absolutely the freedom of belief
concerning matters of ultimate reality.

85.

Sherbert v.Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).

